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Americans Still Overestimate Social
Class Mobility: A Pre-Registered
Self-Replication
Michael W. Kraus*
Yale School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Kraus and Tan (2015) hypothesized that Americans tend to overestimate social class
mobility in society, and do so because they seek to protect the self. This paper reports a
pre-registered exact replication of Study 3 from this original paper and finds, consistent
with the original study, that Americans substantially overestimate social class mobility,
that people provide greater overestimates when made while thinking of similar others,
and that high perceived social class is related to greater overestimates. The current
results provide additional evidence consistent with the idea that people overestimate
class mobility to protect their beliefs in the promise of equality of opportunity. Discussion
considers the utility of pre-registered self-replications as one tool for encouraging
replication efforts and assessing the robustness of effect sizes.
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INTRODUCTION
In their original study Kraus and Tan (2015, p. 101) assert that Americans have a widespread belief
in the American Dream, that people from “any sector of society, have an equal opportunity to
become better educated, earnmore money, and obtain whatever job they desire.” These widespread
beliefs lead to a willful lack of awareness of the actual levels of economic mobility in society.
Individuals adhere to exaggeratedmobility beliefs for two reasons according to the study: (1) People
have little knowledge of statistical information about actual mobility trends; and (2) People are
motivated to satisfy basic need to live within a society whose structure is fair and merit-based.
To support this prediction, the original paper presented four studies showing that people make
large overestimates of mobility in education and income in comparison to available estimates of
actual mobility. Moreover, the studies found that these overestimates are largest when made while
considering people similar to the self—suggesting these estimates are driven by motivations to
protect the self, and that those highest in perceived social class provided the largest overestimates
of class mobility—since their elevated status is more meaningful in a hierarchy where mobility is
possible (Kraus and Tan, 2015).
In the manuscript, Kraus and Tan (2015, p. 101) make several arguments suggesting the
potential practical signiﬁcance of their research: in particular, they suggest that meaningful public
support for economic policy might hinge on “the extent that Americans recognize, and are aware
of, the levels of actual social class mobility in society.” The ﬁndings from the studies have been
reported already in several news websites (Jacobs, 2015; Jaﬀe, 2015), and in an opinion article
for the New York Times (Kraus et al., 2015). The phenomenon of class mobility perceptions has
recently been independently investigated by several laboratories, albeit each using slightly diﬀerent
methodologies (Chambers et al., 2015; Davidai and Gilovich, 2015).
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In light of the potential practical signiﬁcance and theoretical
importance of the phenomenon in question, we attempted a
single pre-registered replication of Study 3 of the original Kraus
and Tan (2015) manuscript. We undertook this eﬀort using
a roughly identical online sample of workers from Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (n= 747), and identical methods as the original
study. We chose, in particular, to replicate Study 3 because it
allows for a test of all the central predictions of the original
manuscript—that Americans overestimate social class mobility,
do so to protect the self, and are particularly likely to do so
the higher they stand in perceived social class. Importantly, this
pre-registered replication attempt follows many of the guidelines
outlined in the replication recipe in that it was designed with a
careful comparison between the original and replication eﬀects,
follows the procedures of the original paper precisely, has high
statistical power, and makes the data and analyses publically
available (Brandt et al., 2014). Moreover, as an original author on
the Kraus and Tan (2015) paper is conducting this replication, a
lack of experience and knowledge of the methods and skills used
in the ﬁrst study cannot be an explanation for any discrepancies
between the original and replication (Cesario, 2014; Roberts,
2015). In addition, given that the design, analysis, data, and
materials used for this replication attempt are pre-registered, the
design is robust to any motivated attempts on the part of the
author to replicate the original ﬁnding at all costs.
Importantly, this pre-registered replication attempt allows us
to practically assess whether a number of statistical techniques
for detecting publication bias (i.e., r-index, test of insuﬃcient
variance, p-curve; Schimmack, 2014a,b; Simonsohn et al., 2014)
can be used as predictors of success or failure of an individual
high-powered replication attempt. Examination of the original
manuscript was conducted using the p-checker application1. For
the Kraus and Tan (2015) paper, the results show low indices of
publication bias: The r-index for the studies was 0.77, indicating
the success rate of rejecting the null hypothesis (90%) was
close to the observed power in the studies (83.5%; Schimmack,
2014a). The test of insuﬃcient variance, which assesses the extent
that the variance of eﬀect sizes matches with expected variance
due to sampling error was 2.05, indicating suﬃcient variance
consistent with low publication bias (Schimmack, 2014b). Finally,
a p-curve analysis of the statistical tests reported in the paper
reveals a pattern of ﬁndings consistent with high evidential value
Z = −15.10, p < 0.0001 (go to2 for the p-curve and disclosure
table; Simonsohn et al., 2014). Together, these publication bias
analyses suggest that a high-powered replication attempt of one
of the original studies from Kraus and Tan (2015) is likely to
deliver similar ﬁndings to that of the original manuscript.
In the replication, posted on Open Science Framework3, we
had participants estimate class mobility on the same six items
as in the original study in general, and also with respect to
individuals “similar to you in terms of goals, abilities, talents,
and motivations.” The latter measure was used to examine how
self-relevance inﬂuences estimates of class mobility. After these
1http://shinyapps.org/apps/p-checker/
2https://osf.io/v2bzw/
3http://osf.io/ecavg
measures, participants estimated statistical information unrelated
to class mobility, rated their own knowledge about social class
mobility, and ﬁlled out demographic information related to
perceived social class, income, educational attainment, age, and
political ideology. These measures were exactly identical to those
used in the original Kraus and Tan (2015) paper.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Methods for this study were pre-registered prior to data
collection at Open Science Framework4 and made public prior
to data collection. The study was approved by the institutional
review boards at the University of Illinois and Yale University,
and all participants provided consent before completing the
experiment. All survey methods and statistical analyses were
identical to those reported in Kraus and Tan (2015). We set a
target sample size of 700 because such a sample provides more
than 95% statistical power to detect an eﬀect size of r = 0.14,
which was the original Study 3 association between perceived
social class and overestimates of class mobility (Kraus and Tan,
2015). The sample of online participants was collected from
Mechanical Turk, just as in the original study, returning a
sample of more than 700 participants (n = 763). Participants
were 18 years of age or older (M = 33.07, SD = 10.88)
and were all American citizens. Participants were paid $1.00
for participating in the survey as in the original study. The
survey took participants less than 10 min to complete. All
participants surveyed were included in analyses except in
speciﬁc cases where they had missing data (3.88% of all
responses).
Participants next completed the same 6-item measure of
social class mobility as in Study 3 of Kraus and Tan (2015)
in general and with respect to someone who is “similar in
terms of goals, abilities, talents, and motivations.” The general
(α = 0.63) and the self-relevant estimates (α = 0.60) showed
internal consistency at similar levels to the original study (see
Table 1 for correlations between speciﬁc mobility estimate items).
We computed two mobility estimate composites for general
and self-relevant mobility estimates (r = 0.79, p < 0.0001)—
with a score of zero indicating perfect agreement between
estimates and actual social class mobility assessed from data in
the Current Population Survey (Mishel et al., 2012). Participants
then ﬁlled out non-mobility estimates for the number of foreign-
born 2014 US World Cup soccer players, the number of
astronauts who were also military personnel, and the number
of astronauts who were also women—scores of zero indicate
perfect agreement with statistics on soccer and astronaut
demographics5 ,6. Lastly, participants ﬁlled out demographic
information about their perceived social class, annual family
income, educational attainment, political ideology, age, and self-
rated knowledge about class mobility. All measures were identical
to Kraus and Tan (2015).
4https://osf.io/tbw3n/
5www.espn.com
6www.nasa.gov
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TABLE 1 | Correlations between individual estimates of social class mobility where higher scores indicate greater overestimates of social class mobility.
Work hours Education
mobility
Students from
top income
Students from
bottom income
Upward income
mobility
Downward
income mobility
Work hours ___
Education mobility 0.48∗ ___
Students from top income 0.10∗ 0.09∗ ___
Students from bottom income 0.09∗ 0.05 0.60∗ ___
Upward income mobility 0.37∗ 0.20∗ 0.21∗ 0.34∗ ___
Downward income mobility 0.24∗ 0.14∗ 0.09∗ 0.17∗ 0.45∗ ___
∗p < 0.05.
FIGURE 1 | Estimates of statistical information unrelated to mobility,
for class mobility for similar individuals to the self, and for class
mobility in general. A score of zero is equivalent to an accurate estimate.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
RESULTS
The original study found that participants signiﬁcantly
overestimated social class mobility relative to data on actual
mobility trends, observing a large eﬀect (Cohen’s d = 3.05).
The replication found a similar pattern with respect to general
mobility estimates t(762) = 36.25, p< 0.01, observing a similarly
large eﬀect size (d = 2.63).
The second prediction from the original study asserts that
overestimates of class mobility are more extreme than general
estimates of statistical information, and should be even more
extreme when made with respect to the self. For this analysis,
we conducted a repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with non-mobility estimates, general classmobility estimates, and
self-relevant class mobility estimates as three levels of a single
factor. The overall analysis was signiﬁcant F(2,1462) = 316.21,
p < 0.01, and revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between all three
groups that aligned with the results from the original study (see
Figure 1). Speciﬁcally, though participants overestimated non-
mobility statistics (M = 7.32, SD = 14.93) they provided larger
overestimates of social class mobility in general (M = 17.22,
SD = 12.62), t(731) = 14.19, p < 0.01, dRM = 0.53 (Morris and
DeShon, 2002; Lakens, 2013). In comparison to general mobility
estimates, participants provided even larger overestimates when
thinking about similar others (M = 22.70, SD = 14.72),
t(762) = 16.46, p< 0.01, dRM = 0.62.
We next explored associations between age, social class
measures, and class mobility estimates. See Table 2 for
correlational analyses examining associations with general (below
the diagonal) and self-relevant (above the diagonal) estimates of
class mobility. The observed correlations were similar to those
in the prior studies except that self-rated knowledge of social
class mobility was not signiﬁcantly associated with knowledge
of mobility in this sample (original r = −0.09, p = 0.02). As in
the original study, conservative ideology and younger age were
both moderately associated with greater overestimates of class
mobility.
In the original study, perceived social class predicted
overestimates of social class mobility even while controlling
for age, objective social class measures, political ideology
and self-rated knowledge. In the replication a similar
TABLE 2 | Correlations between general (below the diagonal) and self-relevant (above the diagonal) social class mobility estimates, social class, age,
self-rated mobility knowledge, and political orientation.
Mobility (Over)
estimate
Subjective social
class
Age Education Income Knowledge Political
ideology
Mobility (Over) estimate − 0.24∗ −0.17∗ −0.04 0.12∗ 0.02 −0.23∗
Subjective social class 0.23∗ −
Age −0.14∗ −0.01 −
Education −0.05 0.29∗ 0.10∗ −
Income 0.10∗ 0.56∗ −0.06 0.17∗ −
Knowledge 0.01 0.15∗ 0.05 0.12∗ 0.04 −
Political ideology −0.22∗ −0.12∗ −0.10∗ 0.08∗ −0.07∗ 0.15∗ −
∗p < 0.05.
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FIGURE 2 | A forest plot of the association between perceived social
class and mobility overestimates after accounting for family income,
educational attainment, self-rated knowledge of mobility, age, and
political ideology. Numbers indicate standardized betas for the original
study, the replication, and from the combined sample. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals. Microsoft excel was used for this plot7.
pattern emerged: In the full model accounting for self-
rated knowledge β = 0.02, t(694) = 0.59, p = 0.55,
political ideology β = −0.20, t(694) = −5.53, p < 0.01, age
β = −0.15, t(694) = −4.14, p < 0.01, income β = −0.06,
t(694) = −1.35, p = 0.18, and education β = −0.09,
t(694) = 2.27, p = 0.02, subjective social class positively
predicted mobility overestimates β = 0.26, t(694) = 5.76,
p < 0.01. As in the original study regression analysis, younger
and more conservative participants tended to provide greater
overestimates of class mobility. As Figure 2 shows, this estimate
was slightly larger in magnitude than the estimate from the
original study. An estimate of the relationship between perceived
social class and mobility estimates was computed based on the
combined samples, and is also depicted in Figure 2. In the
combined sample an eﬀect of perceived social class on mobility
estimates was also observed, β = 0.20, t(1394) = 6.38, p< 0.01.
DISCUSSION
This study tested predictions that Americans tend to overestimate
social class mobility in society, tend to do so to protect the
self, and tend to provide less accurate estimates the higher
they are in perceived social class. The results from this pre-
registered exact replication of Study 3 from Kraus and Tan (2015)
provide evidence consistent with each of these three predictions:
Participants provided large overestimates of social class mobility
that became even larger when considered for individuals similar
to the self. As well, those higher in perceived social class
reported larger overestimates of class mobility than their lower
perceived social class counterparts even after accounting for
objective measures of social class, self-rated knowledge about
class mobility, age, and political ideology. Interestingly, the
replication eﬀort produced a larger association between perceived
7http://mjbrandt.com/2014/06/26/forest-plots-in-excel/
social class and estimates of social class mobility than the original
study. Because the studies were exact in design, sampling error is
the likely cause of this discrepancy.
Researchers, journalists, and policy-makers are concerned
about the replicability of ﬁndings in the scientiﬁc literature
broadly (Estes, 2012; Rolston, 2015), as well as in the social
psychology literature in particular (Brandt et al., 2014). As several
recent replication initiatives attest (Klein et al., 2014; Nosek and
Lakens, 2014), close replications of existing studies happen less
frequently than do conceptual replications in social psychology
and scientiﬁc incentives currently exist to favor conceptual
replications over exact ones even at the expense of accuracy. This
exact replication attempt was undertaken as part of the increasing
focus of social psychology to understand the robustness and
consistency of study results reported in the literature.
It is important to note here that statistical assessments of
publication bias (e.g., p-curve) suggested the high probability
of replication of the original study. These ﬁndings suggest the
utility of assessments of publication bias like p-curve, r-index,
and test of insuﬃcient variance for ﬁnding results in social-
personality psychology with a high probability of replication.
Given that the study was chosen for self-replication knowing
the results of these publication bias statistical assessments, a
reader would be mistaken to think of these replication ﬁndings as
somehow indicative of the replicability of the original authors of
themanuscript, or of social psychology more broadly. Instead, the
results of this work suggest that tools for publication bias do what
they are designed for—they can be used as tools to determine the
robustness of speciﬁc eﬀects within the published literature (e.g.,
Simonsohn et al., 2014).
Notably, this was a self-replication—a pre-registered
replication of one’s own past research. Recently, scholars have
called for self-replications because they allow for researchers
to conduct studies using their own extensive expertise, thereby
contributing to the exactness of experimental methodology
(Cesario, 2014; Roberts, 2015). As some criticisms of close
replications contend that the researchers who conduct
such studies lack experience with the studied methods, self-
replications do not suﬀer from this concern (Schnall, 2014).
Moreover, study pre-registration—wherein a time-stamped
copy of the study materials, hypotheses, and procedures is
posted publically online—prevents researchers from engaging in
questionable research practices in order to replicate their own
eﬀects at all costs (Roberts, 2015). Thus, any diﬀerences between
the original studies and self-replications cannot be explained
by diﬀerences in research expertise or implicit knowledge of
experimental procedures. Although there is no substitute for
cross validation of eﬀects through replication attempts made by
independent laboratories (Klein et al., 2014), self-replications
might be an important step towards inviting more close
replication, in general, into psychological science.
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